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This paper shows that introducing worker heterogeneity into a standard search
and matching model can help increase the volatility of unemployment without vio-
lating the tight negative correlation between vacancies and unemployment, i.e., the
Beveridge curve. In the model, periods of high job destruction and unemployment
correspond with periods of more severe mismatch between the demands of rms
and the qualications of job seekers. A more severe mismatch translates into fewer
successful employment matches conditional on the number of contacts per rm and,
as a result, into a higher expected recruitment cost per worker hired, with adverse
eects on incentives to open vacancies.
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1Introduction
Consider a negative shock to labor productivity in the standard search and matching
model. On impact, rm protability worsens and fewer vacancies are opened. Unemploy-
ment increases through fewer matches. But the decline in the number of new vacancies
and the rise in unemployment make the labor market less tight, with a lower number of
vacancies per unemployed worker. This creates a positive externality on rms and ulti-
mately puts a break on the decline in vacancies and consequent increase in unemployment.
This externality is the main reason why, as shown in Shimer (2005), a reasonably cali-
brated version of the textbook matching model grossly fails to account for the observed
volatility of unemployment. The model can achieve more unemployment volatility only if
a mechanism is introduced to oset the positive externality on vacancy creation.
A natural candidate for such a mechanism is an endogenous job destruction caused
by the productivity shock. There is ample evidence that both transitions in and out
of unemployment contribute to the cyclical volatility of unemployment, with the inow
rate contributing about one third to one half of the volatility of unemployment.1 With
a negative productivity shock, job destruction rises and the entry into unemployment
is increased. The rise in unemployment is reinforced, adding to the volatility due to the
lower matching rate. But the rise in job destruction also reinforces the positive externality
on vacancy creation, because the further increase in unemployment lowers the vacancy to
unemployment ratio even more. As Mortensen and Nagyp al (2007b) demonstrate, in the
most widely used model of endogenous job destruction, due to Mortensen and Pissarides
(1994), the externality is strong enough to make rms increase vacancies, leading to a
negatively sloped Beveridge curve.
This paper shows that the positive externality on vacancy creation from the fall in
tightness can be mitigated when there is heterogeneity in the labor force. In a recession,
rms become more selective in terms of the protability of the employment relationships
they choose to commence and their threshold for hiring a worker becomes tighter than
usual. Firms also become more selective with respect to what workers they retain, thus
job destruction rises and unemployment entry is increased. But the employment rela-
tionships that are endogenously terminated in a recession are those with workers whose
1See, e.g., Shimer (2007) and Fujita and Ramey (2009). Evidence reported in Rogerson and Shimer
(2011) suggest that spikes in job destruction drive part of the initial decline in unemployment during
most downturns. Moreover, evidence from Barsky et al. (1994), Bowlus et al. (2002) and Liu (2003)
that the average labor quality increases in economic downturns, suggest that at least some part of job
separations is driven by endogenous decisions in response to aggregate productivity shocks.
2qualications are not strong enough to secure positive rents to rms, i.e., workers that are
less likely to be employable during bad times. Consequently, at times of low aggregate
productivity and high job destruction there are a lot more unemployed workers looking
for jobs, but at the same time, there is larger dispersion between the demands of rms
and the qualications oered by unemployed workers. Because a rm searches for a good
match among a heterogeneous group of workers, larger dispersion translates into fewer
successful matches, conditional on the vacancy to unemployment ratio, i.e., into a deteri-
oration in matching eciency, with adverse eects on incentives to post vacancies. This
idea is formalized in a relatively standard search and matching model extended to allow
for worker heterogeneity in terms of ability. I show quantitatively that the model with
heterogeneity is capable of increasing the volatility of unemployment without violating
the tight negative correlation between vacancies and unemployment.
Recent empirical literature suggests that matching eciency can, indeed, decline sub-
stantially in a recession. For instance, Elsby et al. (2010) report that the outow rate
from unemployment, conditional on the vacancy-unemployment ratio, has been very low
during the 2008-2009 recession. Likewise, Davis et al. (2010) show a dramatic decline in
the vacancy yield during the same period. Evidence of a strong cyclical component in
matching eciency can also be found in Barnichon and Figura (2010, 2011), Daly et al.
(2011) and Sahin et al. (2011). Further, a large empirical literature studying the match-
ing function links changes in matching eciency to aggregation issues often disguised
under the term mismatch: the disparity between the characteristics of job seekers and
the requirements of rms.2 In line with the mismatch hypothesis, the model developed
in this paper captures an endogenous mechanism that generates mismatch-driven cyclical
changes in matching eciency.
The model also accounts for the coexistence of a large number of short unemployment
spells with a small number of workers who stay unemployed for much longer. Shimer
2The model I propose relies on unobservable heterogeneity and emphasizes a type of mismatch that
is more likely to occur within small segments of the labor market, due to rms becoming more selective
with respect to what workers to hire and retain. But the degree of disaggregation that can be achieved
by available data is limited. For this reason, empirical studies that examine the mismatch hypothesis rely
on broad disaggregations such as dierences in the distribution of locations or industrial sectors between
unemployed workers and vacancies (see, e.g., Lilien 1982, Elsby et al. 2010, Barnichon and Figura
2010, Daly et al. 2011 and Sahin et al. 2011). The hypothesis that the losses in matching eciency
observed during the recent recession can be attributed to imbalances in labor supply and demand across
industries has received only mixed support in the empirical literature. If such imbalances were present, we
would expect growing industries facing much larger falls in vacancy yields than struggling industries. In
contrast, vacancy yields have been below expectations across all industries, suggesting that the shortfalls
in vacancy yields are due to rms with vacancies becoming more selective about lling them, in line with
my assumptions.
3(2008) documents a strong negative duration dependence in re-employment probabilities
and interprets his nding as evidence for the view that workers who fail to quickly nd jobs
need to wait for new vacancies to come into the market. Likewise, Coles and Petrongolo
(2003) nd that the re-employment rate of some of the newly unemployed workers depends
statistically on the inow of new vacancies and not on the vacancy stock. They interpret
this nding as evidence that some newly unemployed workers are on the long-side of
their market. Consistent with these ndings, in the model presented here, some of the
newly unemployed workers - particularly those with lower ability - will manage to exit
unemployment only when economic conditions improve and the hiring margin becomes
looser again, in the sense that workers with lower ability are hired.
A few other papers also explore the role of heterogeneity in generating more cycli-
cal volatility in matching models. The papers most related to this one are Pries (2008)
and Bils et al. (2010).3 Pries (2008), incorporates worker heterogeneity in terms of pro-
ductivity into a relatively standard matching model to demonstrate that the changing
composition of unemployment can increase labor market volatility. In particular, Pries
argues that if during downturns the unemployment pool consists of a larger than usual
share of low-productivity workers, who generate lower surplus to employers, then rms
have less incentive to open vacancies. My model is complementary to Pries's model
in that I allow for endogenous separations, while Pries allows for only exogenous separa-
tions. But my analysis emphasizes a dierent channel through which worker heterogeneity
can generate more volatility in job creation.4 In the model developed here, the driving
force behind the enhanced responsiveness of vacancies to productivity shocks are not the
compositional changes in the unemployment pool, but the adjustments in the match ac-
3Another related paper is Guerrieri (2007). She also pursues the idea that cyclical adjustments in
the hiring margin can be a potential source of volatility in job creation, but her model diers from
mine in several aspects. It is a competitive search model with homogeneous workers and only exogenous
separations. Her main nding is that in such a model the adjustments in the hiring margin do not
contribute to more volatility in job creation. Some other studies, such as Krause and Lubik (2007),
Nagyp al (2007) and Tasci (2007), also explore the interaction between worker heterogeneity and labor
market volatility, but focus on the heterogeneity introduced by on-the-job search.
4In Pries's model, the shift in the unemployment pool towards low-productivity workers is imposed
exogenously by considering a larger increase in the exogenous separation rate for low-productivity workers.
It is not clear cut, however, that a model with endogenous separations can predict such a shift. In such a
model, just as in the present model, the workers laid o in a recession are more productive than those laid
o in a boom, meaning that in a recession the share of low-productivity workers in the unemployment
pool is smaller, not larger, than usual. Evidence suggest that the skill composition of the unemployed
does not change much over the business cycle (see, e.g., Elsby et al. 2010 and Barnichon and Figura 2010),
while evidence based on unobservable heterogeneity point to a reversed impact than the one assumed by
Pries. Using CPS data Mueller (2011) nds that the average residual wage of the unemployed is strongly
countercyclical.
4ceptance/continuation threshold that cause procycyclical changes in matching eciency.
Pries's model precludes such eects due to the assumption that all matches are acceptable
at all times.
Bils et al.(2010) consider a variant of the Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) where work-
ers are risk averse and therefore heterogeneous in terms of their willingness to trade search
for work (i.e., in terms of their reservation wage). The question they ask is whether their
model can produce both realistic uctuations in unemployment and a realistic dispersion
in wage growth within matches. For this reason, they abstract from other sources of het-
erogeneity and consider only match-quality shocks, which are necessary to generate wage
changes within matches.5 In their model, dierences in worker's reservation wages re-
ect dierences in their wealth, that in turn, reect dierences in their histories of match
qualities and unemployment spells. Having both worker heterogeneity and a match accep-
tance decision, their model captures a channel for volatility in vacancies that is similar to
the one emphasized in this paper. Just as in the present model, endogenous separations
may depress vacancy creation, if they are concentrated on workers with high reservation
wages, who are less likely to be employable during bad times. However, in their calibrated
model the dispersion in reservation wages across workers is relatively small, meaning that
dierences in rents across matches reect mainly match-quality shocks. The Beveridge
curve correlation in their calibrated model is therefore weak, because the matches that
endogenously break up in their model are mainly low-quality matches, as opposed to
matches with workers whose reservation wage is high. Freeing up workers by destructing
such low-quality matches facilitates the creation of new more productive jobs.
The paper is organized as follows. Section I lays out the set up of the model under
study and characterizes the steady-state equilibrium. Section II presents steady-state
comparisons that characterize the response of key labor-market variables to aggregate
productivity shocks. Section III presents some quantitative results. Section IV briey
discusses some of the model's assumptions and Section V concludes.
I The Model
The model is in discrete time. The economy is populated by ex-ante heterogeneous risk-
neutral workers of measure one and rms of a large measure. Workers dier in terms of
5In two related papers (Bils et al. 2007 and 2009) the same authors consider versions of the model
where workers are also heterogeneous in terms of labor market ability, but assume that markets are
segmented by ability.
5their ability, which is measured by x. Ability is distributed according to the cumulative
distribution function F() with support X  [x;  x] and associated density function f().
In any period, a worker may be either employed or unemployed, while a rm may be either
matched with a worker and producing or posting a vacancy. A type-x worker produces
ytp(x) units of output, where yt is a stochastic aggregate productivity component and p(x)
is a constant worker-specic productivity component that increases with the worker's
ability: p0(x) > 0. Unemployed workers receive a constant ow benet b per period.
Firms that post a vacancy pay a constant cost c per period. The number of vacancies is
determined by free entry. Hence, rms open vacancies until the expected value of doing
so becomes zero.
Ability is assumed to be observable to the rm, but only when the rm actually meets
with the worker. Firms cannot learn about the workers' abilities prior to meeting with
them. For this reason, they cannot direct their search to workers of a particular ability
level. There is therefore a single matching market with a meeting function determining
the number of contacts/matches.6 More precisely, let ut(x) and vt denote the number of
unemployed workers of type x and posted vacancies, respectively, in period t. The total
number of matches between searching workers and rms in period t is determined by a
matching function M(vt;ut) = v
1 
t u
t , where ut =
R  x
x ut(x)dx gives the total number of
unemployed workers in period t.7 The probability that a worker matches with a rm can
be written as m(t), where t = vt
ut measures the tightness of the labor market. Likewise,
a vacancy matches with a worker (of any type) with probability q(t) and with a worker
of type x with probability q(t)
ut(x)
ut .
Each period, before production takes place, matched workers and rms (including
those in ongoing employment relationships) negotiate on a contract that divides the sur-
plus of the match according to the Nash Bargaining solution. The worker's bargaining
6The idea is that observationally equivalent workers (i.e, workers with similar education and experi-
ence) may actually dier in terms of their ability to perform similar jobs and that employers can learn
about these dierences only during the interview process. After all, one of the most important reasons em-
ployers interview their applicants is to learn about their inherent abilities, because other characteristics,
such as education and experience are usually known to employers prior to the interview. Consequently,
even if rms can eectively direct their vacancies towards workers with a particular education/experience
level, they still have to search among a pool of applicants that is heterogeneous in terms of ability. These
assumptions are consistent with a large empirical literature that documents signicant wage dierences
among observationally equivalent workers (see, e.g., Mortensen 2003).
7With the term \match" I refer to a meeting between a searching worker and a rm with a vacancy.
As I explain below, a meeting may or may not lead to the beginning of a new employment relationship,
because an agreement may not be reached. I use the terms \employment relationship" and \employment
match" to refer to the cases where an agreement has been reached and the pair has decided to start
producing.
6weight is  and the disagreement point is separation. Let St(x) denote the surplus of
a match between a rm and a worker of type x in period t. A worker and a rm will
choose to continue or begin an employment relationship only if St(x) > 0, and will agree
to separate if St(x) = 0, in which case separation is jointly optimal. Since the surplus
of an employment relationship is increasing in the productivity and therefore the ability
of the worker, there will be a reservation productivity p(Rt) and a reservation ability Rt,
such that S(Rt) = 0. Hence, the worker and the rm will choose to continue or commence
any employment relationship with x > Rt. Aside from the jointly optimal separations,
known as endogenous separations, employment matches also face a risk of separating for
exogenous reasons with a probability s.
The timing of events and decisions within a period is as follows. At the beginning of
each period matches between unemployed workers and vacancies are realized. At the same
time, a randomly selected fraction s of ongoing employment relationships is destroyed for
exogenous reasons. Subsequently, aggregate productivity, yt, is realized. Upon observing
yt, workers and rms in surviving relationships bargain a new wage if there is still a
surplus to share, i.e., if x > Rt. In the opposite case, they optimally separate. Likewise,
the newly matched workers decide whether or not to begin an employment relationship
with the wage reecting worker-rm bargaining. If, given the realization of aggregate
productivity, the worker's ability is suciency large, i.e., if x > Rt, so that the surplus
of the employment relationship is positive, then a new employment relationship begins.
Otherwise, the rm and the worker continue searching. Finally, production takes place
and unemployed workers and vacancies engage in search.
Value Functions
The unemployment value, Ut(x), and the value of a match, Wt(x), to a worker of ability
x satisfy:
Ut(x) = b + Et [m(t)Wt+1(x) + (1   m(t))Ut+1(x)] (1)
Wt(x) = maxfwt(x) + Et [sUt+1(x) + (1   s)Wt+1(x)];Ut(x)g (2)
where Et is the expectation operator, wt(x) the wage rate and  = 1
1+r the discount factor.
The value of a vacancy is given by







Jt+1(x)dx + (1   q(t))Vt+1

(3)
7and the value of a match with a type-x worker to a rm is given by
Jt(x) = maxfytp(x)   wt(x) + Et [sVt+1(x) + (1   s)Jt+1(x)];Vtg (4)
In (1) the payo in the current period for an unemployed worker is b; with probability
m(t) the worker matches with a vacancy yielding a value Wt+1(x) and in the opposite
case the worker remains unmatched yielding a value Ut+1. The rst term in the bracket of
equation (2) is the value of an employment relationship to a type-x worker. An employed
type-x worker earns the wage wt(x) and faces the risk of an exogenous separation that
occurs with probability s. If the relationship exogenously breaks up, the worker becomes
unemployed yielding a value Ut+1, but if the relationship survives, the continuation value
is Wt+1(x). A worker will choose to stay in (or commence) an employment relationship
only if the value of being in the employment relationship is greater than the value of being
unemployed. Accordingly, the value of a match to the worker is the maximum between
the two. Likewise, in (4), the value of a match with a type-x worker to the rm is the
maximum between the value of being in an employment relationship with that worker and
the value of being vacant. If the rm chooses to commence (or stay in) an employment
relationship with the worker, it produces output ytp(x), pays the wage wt(x) and faces
the risk of an exogenous separation that occurs with probability s. In (3), a rm with
a vacancy incurs a cost c and matches with a type-x worker with probability q(t)
ut(x)
ut ,
yielding a value Jt+1(x). With probability 1 q(t) the rm fails to match with a worker
yielding a value Vt+1.
The wage rate, wt(x), satises the Nash conditions, Wt(x)   Ut(x) = St(x) and
Jt(x)   Vt = (1   )St(x). Moreover, in a free-entry equilibrium Vt = 0 holds for all t.
Using these conditions we can write the surplus of a match, when the worker's ability is
x as
St(x) = maxfytp(x)   b + EtSt+1(x)[1   s   m()];0g (5)
and the value in (3) as
c
q(t)






The law of motion for the unemployment of a type-x worker is given by
ut+1(x) = ut(x) + s(f(x)   ut(x))   ut(x)m(t)I + (x) (7)
8where (x) captures discrete jumps from employment to unemployment due to endogenous
separations, and I is an indicator function, which takes the value of 1 if the worker's ability
is equal or above the reservation ability and 0 otherwise. Specically, (x) = 0, I = 1, if
x > Rt, and (x) = (1   s)(f(x)   ut(x)), I = 0, otherwise.
Equations (5) to (7) determine the free-entry equilibrium path of t for given realiza-
tions of the aggregate productivity process.
The steady-state equilibrium
Here I characterize the properties of the non-stochastic steady state, where the the aggre-
gate state, y and the distribution of unemployment across dierent types of workers are
constant.
The steady-state surplus of a match when the worker's type is x is given by
S(x) = maxf
yp(x)   b
(r + s + m())
;0g (8)
























Employed workers with x > R face only the risk of an exogenous separation that occurs
with probability s. However, workers with x  R separate at rate 1, because even if they
manage to survive the exogenous separation shock, they will separate endogenously. The





and can be written as
~ s = F(R)(1   s) + s (12)
9It is clear from (9) that R is decreasing in y, meaning F(R) is also decreasing in y. The
model therefore features countercyclical uctuations in the separation rate: a reduction
in y raises the reservation productivity leading to more endogenous separations.
The average job nding and job lling rates dier from the matching rates m() and
q(), respectively, because only matches with workers whose productivity is above the
reservation productivity will continue as employment matches. In particular, the average










~ m = (R;)(1   F(R))m()






The term (R;) measures the probability that an unemployed worker has ability x > R.
The free-entry condition that determines the steady-state value of  is given by,
c
q()













(r + s + m())
(16)
The free-entry condition is such that the expected surplus from lling a vacancy equals the
expected recruitment cost. If the expected surplus is higher than the expected recruitment
cost (i.e., if the right-hand side of (16) is higher than its left-hand-side), rms open more
vacancies per job seeker until all rents are exhausted.
The main dierence between this model and other models that allow for endogenous
separations is the presence of the term (R;) in the free-entry condition. A larger
(R;) means that the number of employment relationships that are expected to be
formed, conditional on the number of contacts per rm, is larger. In other words, a larger
(R;) implies an improvement in matching eciency, and therefore, a decline in the
recruitment cost a rm expects to pay on average in order to ll a vacancy. Notice from
(14) that (R;) is decreasing in R, meaning that a rise in the reservation productivity
10(and thus ability) deteriorates matching eciency and causes the expected recruitment
cost to rise, with adverse eects on incentives to open vacancies. Intuitively, when rm
protability is lower and thus rms are more selective with the workers they are willing
to hire, they are also more reluctant to open vacancies, because they anticipate that they
will have more diculty nding suitable workers to ll them. Hence, the model captures
a new source of cyclical uctuations in vacancies, that comes from the impact of changes
in the reservation productivity on the expected recruitment cost. In this model, the rise
in unemployment that occurs in a recession due to the rise job destruction, i.e., due to
the rise in R, lowers the vacancy to unemployment ratio without reinforcing the positive
externality on vacancy creation. In contrast, the further increase in unemployment acts
to further depress job creation, because the workers that enter unemployment due to
endogenous separations are those whose productivity falls below the rms' acceptance
threshold. Such workers congest the market during downturns, making it more dicult
for rms to locate workers whose productivity is above the acceptance threshold. These
workers will make it easier for rms to ll their vacancies only when economic conditions
improve and the acceptance threshold falls again, as captured by the negative relation
between R and (R;).8
For the results below, it is also useful to characterize the replacement ratio. The
replacement ratio in the model is ~ b = b
y~ p, where ~ p =
R  x
R p(x)dF(x)
1 F(R) is the average worker-
specic productivity among the employed.
II Steady-State Comparisons
Next, I derive results that describe how the key labor-market variables in the model
respond to changes in aggregate productivity.9
By taking logs of (11) and dierentiating the result with respect to lny we obtain the
8It is perhaps useful to clarify that this feature of the model is not due to endogenous separations being
concentrated on low-ability workers. Even if one assumed that prots per worker are non-monotonic in
ability, or even falling monotonically with ability, so that the workers laid o are not necessarily the
least able, this feature would still be present. For instance, one could assume that higher ability workers
generate lower prots to employers, say because they have a much better outside option and so need
to paid much more. If this was the case, the workers laid o in a recession would be the most able.
Nevertheless, the congestion eects mentioned here would still be present, because the most able workers
in this case would be those that generate smaller prots, making employers reluctant to hire them during
downturns.
9I follow a common practice and derive elasticities of the key labor-market variables with respect to
aggregate productivity to gauge the cyclical response of the model. Examples of studies that follow the
same approach are Mortensen and Nagyp al (2007a,b) and Pissarides (2009). For a discussion of how
good such an approximation is, see Mortensen and Nagyp al (2007b).



















where it may be recalled that  denotes the elasticity of the matching function with respect
to the unemployment rate. The rst term captures the eect of changes in aggregate
productivity on the unemployment rate through the impact of such changes on market
tightness. The second term captures the impact of changes in the reservation ability.
Clearly, the negative response of the reservation ability amplies the negative response of
unemployment to aggregate productivity shocks. Thus, this model can generate a larger
volatility of unemployment than the model with a constant separation rate (canonical
model, henceforth), analyzed in Shimer (2005). However, if the model fails to also generate
suciently larger volatility in tightness than the canonical model, then it will fail to










If the positive elasticity of  with respect to aggregate productivity is not much larger,
while the negative elasticity of unemployment is much larger than in the canonical model,
then the resulting elasticity of vacancies will be small or even negative; equivalently, if the
elasticity of  with respect to aggregate productivity is not suciently larger than that
of the canonical model, the model will generate a very small or even positive covariance
between unemployment and vacancies.



















Because the term in the bracket is positive, a larger response in market tightness implies a
larger (positive) response in the vacancy rate. But the negative response of the reservation
ability dampens the response of the vacancy rate, as captured by the second term in the
above expression. This means that the model can explain jointly the cyclical behavior of
unemployment and vacancies, only if in addition to the larger volatility in unemployment,
it generates a suciently larger volatility in market tightness than the canonical model.
The most widely used model of endogenous separations, due to Mortensen and Pis-
12sarides (1994), predicts a counter-cyclical vacancy rate, because it delivers signicantly
larger volatility in unemployment, but no more volatility in market tightness than the
canonical model. The elasticity of tightness in the canonical model with only a constant





r + s + m()






where ~ bc = b
yp gives the replacement ratio. As shown in Mortensen and Nagyp al (2007b),
the elasticity of market tightness in the Mortensen and Pissarides model (the MP model,
henceforth) is observationally equivalent to that in the canonical model, given in (20).
Thus, when both models are calibrated in the same way, i.e., given equal replacement
ratios, average job nding and separation rates, and parameter values for ;r and ,
they yield identical elasticities of market tightness. As mentioned in the introduction, the
reason behind this result is the endogenous response of vacancies to the fall in tightness,
caused by the rise in unemployment.
The current model has the potential to deliver more volatility in market tightness,
because, as explained above, it captures a new mechanism that can help mitigate the
positive externality on vacancy creation from the fall in tightness. By taking logs of the
free-entry condition in (16) and dierentiating the result with respect to lny we obtain





r + s + m()









Notice that the term
@ ln(R;)
@ lny that reects the impact of changes in aggregate produc-
tivity on matching eciency enters with a positive sign in (21) but is absent from (20).
Consequently, if this term is positive, the elasticity of tightness with respect to aggregate
productivity in the present model can be higher than that in the MP model.














The rst term reects the impact of changes in market tightness: an increase in , and
as a consequence, an increase in the workers' matching rate, m(), deteriorates matching
eciency, because it lowers the share of workers with x > R in the unemployment pool.
13The second term captures the impact of changes in the reservation ability: an increase in
R implies a lower share of workers with x > R in the unemployment pool and therefore
a deterioration of matching eciency. While the eect of changes in market tightness
is negative on the elasticity of (R;), the eect of changes in the reservation ability
is positive, because the response of the reservation ability is countercyclical. As shown
in Section III, for realistic parameter values the eect of changes in reservation ability
dominates that of changes in market tightness so that
@ ln(R;)
@ lny > 0.
The elasticity of the job nding rate, ~ m, with respect to aggregate productivity can
be expressed as:



















The job nding rate responds to changes in aggregate productivity due to the impact of
such changes on both the market tightness (rst term) and the reservation ability (second
term).
The separation rate responds to aggregate productivity shocks due to the impact of
such changes on the reservation ability. Specically,








Finally, by taking logs of (9) and dierentiating with respect to lny, we can write the







where p(R) denotes the elasticity of the productivity function p(x) with respect to x,
evaluated at x = R.
It is also worth mentioning here that an additional channel through which the model
can generate a larger change in the vacancy rate relative to that in labor productivity is
the divergence between aggregate and labor productivity, which is a common feature of
models that allow for endogenous separations. Because the reservation productivity moves
countercyclically, the average worker-specic productivity among the employed workers, ~ p
is lower at higher y. For this reason, a percentage increase in the aggregate component of












@ lny is less than one, because @ lnR
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(27)
This means that the change in variable z relative to that in labor productivity is larger
in this model than that in the canonical model. Moreover, since both models are cali-
brated to match the empirical volatility of the average productivity of labor, y-shocks are
larger in this model than in the canonical model. In turn, larger y-shocks generate larger
uctuations in the key labor market variables.
III Some Quantitative Results
Next, I present some quantitative results of the model. In my baseline calculations I use
the same parameter values and targets used by Shimer (2005), who reports the results
of the canonical model. Hence, aggregate productivity is normalized to y = 1 and the
quarterly discount rate is r = 0:012. I set the elasticity parameter to  = 0:72, let
worker's bargaining power take the same value,  = 0:72 and set the replacement ratio to
0.40. Finally, I target an average separation rate of 0.10 and an average job nding rate
of 1.355.
With the above calibration approach we can obtain the model-implied elasticities of
the job nding rate, tightness, vacancies and unemployment, for a given endogenous
fraction F(R) and elasticity of the separation rate with respect to aggregate productivity.
In order to derive the fraction F(R) and the separations elasticity we need information
about the distribution of productivity across employment matches. Since the exact shape
of this distribution matters only for the volatility of separations, I choose not to impose a
particular shape for this distribution.10 Instead, I set the separations elasticity equal to its
10Because there is no obvious empirical counterpart to which this distribution should be matched, the
shape of this distribution is usually chosen in a rather ad hoc fashion. For instance, Mortensen and
Nagyp al (2007b) derive the results of the MP model assuming that the productivity distribution is log-
normal over [0;1]. Pissarides (2007), on the other hand, calibrates a version of the MP model where,
as in Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), the productivity distribution is uniform in the range [;1] and
15empirical counterpart, which based on Table 1 in Shimer (2005) equals  1:97 and derive
results for dierent values of F(R). This enables me to examine whether the model can
generate realistic uctuations in both unemployment and vacancies for reasonable amount
of variation in job separations, which is the central issue here.
I use the elasticities derived in Mortensen and Nagyp al (2007b) to also compute results
for the MP model, using the same calibration approach. I set equal replacement ratios,
separation rates, job nding rates and separations elasticities and let the parameters y,r,
and  take the same values in both models.11 This implies that any dierences in the
predicted volatilities of tightness, vacancies and unemployment found between the two
models must come from the cyclical changes in matching eciency that are present in
the current model, but absent from the MP model. Comparing the results of the two
models, derived with this calibration, helps quantify the role of worker heterogeneity in
amplifying the volatility of job creation.
Table 1 reports the model-implied elasticities of the key labor-market variables both
with respect to aggregate and labor productivity. I use the notation i;j to denote the
elasticity of the variable i with respect to variable j. The table also reports the results
of the MP model (in parentheses), the results of the canonical model and the relevant
empirical responses (labeled as data) based on Table 1 in Shimer (2005).12 The model has
no trouble generating a large enough (negative) change in the unemployment rate relative
to changes in labor productivity and generates signicantly larger volatility in tightness
than both the canonical and the MP model. The response of tightness to aggregate
productivity shocks in the MP model is the same as in the canonical model, while in the
current model it is much larger. Hence, endogenous job destruction does not contribute to
more volatility in tightness in the MP model, but has a signicant impact on the volatility
of tightness in the current model. The current model generates realistic uctuations in
unemployment, and at the same time, predicts a procyclical vacancy rate.
The model with worker heterogeneity clearly outperforms the MP model, but still, for
the selected parameter values, it cannot explain the magnitude of variation in tightness,
chooses a number for  that implies a separations elasticity matching the gure observed in the data.
11In the current model, F(R) measures the probability that a worker is unemployable, while in the MP
model the probability that a match-specic productivity draw is below the reservation productivity. In
deriving the results below I let F(R) take the same value in both models. Moreover, it is reasonable to
assume that F(R) is small. I therefore choose small values for this fraction.
12As Mortensen and Nagyp al (2007b) point out, the empirical equivalent to the elasticity of x with
respect to change in y in the model with endogenous separations is the OLS coecient xy
x
y, where xy
is the correlation between lnx and lny and x is the standard deviation of lnx. Table 1 reports the same
OLS coecients.
16Table 1: Model results at ~ b = 0:4
F(R) ;y v;y u;y  ~ m;y
0:5% 4:24 0:66  3:58 3:83
(1:72  0:39  2:11 0:49)
1% 4:26 0:64  3:63 3:87
(1:72  0:40  2:12 0:50)
2% 4:31 0:58  3:73 3:96
(1:72  0:42  2:13 0:52)
3% 4:37 0:51  3:86 4:06
(1:72  0:43  2:15 0:54)
F(R) ;y~ p v;y~ p u;y~ p  ~ m;y~ p y~ p;y
0:5% 5:17 0:81  4:36 4:67 0:82
(1:90  0:44  2:34 0:54 0:90)
1% 5:19 0:77  4:42 4:72 0:82
(1:91  0:45  2:35 0:55 0:90)
2% 5:25 0:70  4:55 4:83 0:82
(1:91  0:46  2:37 0:57 0:90)
3% 5:33 0:62  4:70 4:95 0:82
(1:91  0:48  2:39 0:60 0:90)
data 7:56 3:68  3:88 2:34
canonical 1:72 1:27  0:45 0:48
and as a consequence, in the vacancy rate we observe in the data. This may be due
to Shimer's replacement ratio of 0:4, being too low. From equations (20) and (21) it is
evident that a higher replacement ratio in our calibrations implies a larger elasticity of
market tightness. This is because a higher replacement ratio reduces the rm's prots
so that cyclical shocks have a bigger proportional impact on prots, and thus vacancy
creation. Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) agree that Shimer's replacement ratio is too
low, because it does not include the value of leisure or home production, but they suggest
a replacement ratio of 0.955, which seems implausibly large. Hall and Milgrom (2008)
improve on this by estimating the value of additional leisure using evidence on the Frisch
elasticity of labor supply. Their suggested replacement ratio, which includes both unem-
ployment insurance and the value of leisure, is 0.71; a value that is commonly used in
recent studies.13 As shown in Table 2, setting the replacement ratio equal to the value
suggested by Hall and Milgrom improves the results considerably. The elasticities of mar-
ket tightness and vacancies obtained from the present model are now very close to their
empirical equivalents, while those obtained from the MP model are still much smaller
13See, for instance, Pissarides (2009) and Brugemann and Moscarini (2010).
17Table 2: Model results at ~ b = 0:71
F(R) ;y v;y u;y  ~ m;y
0:5% 6:03 2:02  4:01 4:30
(3:55 0:87  2:68 1:00)
1% 6:01 1:99  4:02 4:29
(3:55 0:87  2:69 1:01)
2% 5:96 1:94  4:02 4:26
(3:55 0:85  2:70 1:03)
3% 5:92 1:88  4:03 4:25
(3:55 0:83  2:72 1:05)
F(R) ;y~ p v;y~ p u;y~ p  ~ m;y~ p y~ p;y
0:5% 7:35 2:46  4:89 5:24 0:82
(3:74 0:92  2:82 1:06 0:95)
1% 7:32 2:43  4:90 5:22 0:82
(3:74 0:91  2:83 1:07 0:95)
2% 7:27 2:36  4:90 5:20 0:82
(3:74 0:89  2:85 1:09 0:95)
3% 7:21 2:30  4:91 5:18 0:82
(3:74 0:88  2:87 1:11 0:95)
data 7:56 3:68  3:88 2:34
canonical 3:55 2:63  0:93 0:99
than in the data.
IV Discussion
The cyclical changes in matching eciency emphasized above, are partly driven by the
assumption that workers who are not employable, i.e., workers whose productivity falls
below the threshold for hiring, stay in the unemployment pool, thereby making it more
dicult for searching rms to locate more productive workers. In the current setting,
these workers have an incentive to stay in the unemployment pool, because matches are
realized prior to the aggregate state. There is therefore always a chance that aggregate
conditions will improve and the reservation productivity will fall by the time these workers
nd a match. It may be worthwhile, however, to comment on some additional reasons
that such workers stay attached.
First, workers may have limited information for how well their attributes match with
the demands of available jobs. One of the most important reasons employers interview
18their applicants is to learn about their inherent abilities and other characteristics that
cannot be identied prior to meeting with them. Likewise, workers may want to meet
with potential employers and obtain more information about their demands, before they
can assess whether they would be employable in available jobs or not. Hence, it may be the
case that workers cannot determine whether they are employable in available jobs, unless
they search for them. Second, even if jobs are hard to nd, workers have an incentive to
stay attached, because they want to be entitled to unemployment benets.
Finally, suppose that a match-specic productivity component of productivity is ran-
domly drawn each time a new match is formed. In such a setting, the worker-specic
reservation productivity (or ability) would be lower on matches whose match-specic pro-
ductivity component is higher. Thus, the possibility of a match-specic productivity draw
that is high enough to bring the overall productivity of their match above the acceptance
threshold, would give an additional incentive for marginal workers to stay attached. The
approach taken in this paper has been to keep the model simple in order to make the
role of worker heterogeneity more transparent. Match productivity has therefore been
assumed to depend only on the worker's ability. But the current setting can be viewed
as the limiting case of this generalized set up, where both worker- and match-specic
heterogeneity are present. To understand why, suppose that during periods of low aggre-
gate productivity some marginal workers cannot be hired in new jobs unless their draw
of match-specic productivity turns out to be exceptionally high. As the probability of
such an exceptionally high productivity draw approaches zero, the labor market volatility
in this generalized setting approaches the one in the simpler setting developed here.
V Conclusion
In this paper I have shown that introducing worker heterogeneity in a relatively standard
search and matching model can help in amplifying the responsiveness of unemployment
to productivity without violating the Beveridge curve correlation. An interesting prop-
erty of the model is that it reconciles endogenous separations with the Beveridge curve
without introducing complex features relative to the most widely used model of endoge-
nous separations, due to Mortensen and Pissarides (1994). The only dierence is that
this model allows for match productivity to depend on workers' ability, which seems to
be a natural assumption, while in the Mortensen and Pissarides model it is randomly
drawn. The interaction between worker heterogeneity and an endogenous match accep-
19tance/continuation decision generates cyclical changes in matching eciency that help in
amplifying the response of job creation to productivity shocks. Specically, as the rms'
threshold for hiring or retaining a worker becomes tighter in a recession, job destruction
rises and unemployment is increased, but at the same time, matching eciency falls. The
fall in matching eciency osets the positive externality from the fall in tightness on
vacancy creation and acts to further depress vacancy creation in a recession.
I have stressed that this mechanism provides a solution to the standard model's failure
to generate sucient unemployment volatility, but incorporating this mechanism into
more generalized settings, can also shed light on some other important questions that
remain open. One such question is whether search theoretic models of the labor market can
explain the wedge between the marginal rate of substitution of consumption for leisure and
the marginal product of labor, often called the \labor wedge." As Rogerson and Shimer
(2011) argue, in a model with search frictions the labor wedge is positively correlated
with employment, but the opposite holds in the data. This is because search frictions act
as an adjustment cost that dampens uctuations in employment. Specically, increasing
the vacancy to unemployment ratio in response to a positive productivity shock is costly,
because doing so reduces the probability for each vacancy-posting rm to match with a
worker. As this paper has shown, the negative externality from the rise in the vacancy to
unemployment ratio on the matching probability of rms can be mitigated when there is
worker heterogeneity in the model. Moreover, as rms become more selective about lling
vacancies during bad times and less selective during booms, some workers are constrained
from working as much as they would like to in a recession and vice-versa in a boom. These
provide potential explanations to the counter-cyclical labor wedge. Further investigation
along these lines might give new insights into the cyclical behavior of the labor wedge in
the presence of search frictions.
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